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In recent years, the Civil Society Education Fund has supported national education civil society
coalitions (NECs) in low-income countries so that they put pressure on governments and 
donors to implement the Education for All agenda and the Millennium Development Goal on 
education. The article draws on literature on global governance as well as on an extensive 
evaluation of the CSEF to explore the actual contribution of this initiative to the activity of 
NECs. This article highlights the achievements and shortcomings of the CSEF and includes a 
set of practical recommendations on the role of global civil society in international 
development processes.
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Introduction
Between 2000 and 2015, the Education for All (EFA) programme has established the
main goals of global educational development. These goals were approved in the World
Education Forum held in Dakar in 2000, and afterwards were coordinated and monitored
by  a  consortium of  international  donors  led  by  UNESCO.  National  and  global  civil
society organisations were strategic in the definition of the EFA agenda, as well as in the
monitoring and evaluation of progress towards the EFA goals. Because of this reason,
key  international  donors  established  funds  to  support  the  promotion  of  civil  society
coalitions that advocate for Education for All in low-income countries, including the so-
called Civil Society Education Fund (CSEF).1 The CSEF was established in order to build
the capacities of civil society organisations to advocate for EFA in a great variety of low-
income  countries  (Archer  2010).  The  CSEF  is  a  global  initiative  run  by  different
2stakeholders mainly in Africa, Asia and Latin America, that eventually provided support
to  National  Educational  Coalitions  (NECs)  comprising  teachers  unions,  NGOs  and
community associations.
This paper reflects on the global governance of educational development on the
basis of a systematic analysis of the CSEF initiative. The initial  sections of the paper
elaborate on relevant research debates and on our theoretical orientations to the global
governance  of  education  theme.  Afterwards,  the  organisation  of  the  CSEF  and  the
methodology  of  the  study  are  briefly  presented.  The  following  sections  analyse  the
functioning of the CSEF between 2009 and 2011 according to a set of normative criteria
that can be applied to global governance affairs (cf. Biersteker 2015). The final section
links  the findings  back to the theoretical  framework as a way to make some general
claims and define policy recommendations. Main sources of data come from the official
internal evaluation of the CSEF that was commissioned by the Global Partnership for
Education (GPE) in 2012 to our team  [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the
review process]
The global governance of education
In  addition  to  international  organisations  such  as  UNESCO,  the  World  Bank  or  the
OECD,  non-state  actors  such  as  global  teacher  unions,  international  NGOs,  social
movements and activist networks have become significant voices in the field of global
education  policy  (MacPherson  2016).  Observers  agree  that  these  political  actors
coordinate  their  action  in  a  fluid  yet  influential  way  that  also  builds  new  forms  of
legitimation. Political scientists normally label this pattern as the governance shift, which
metaphorically associates the steering of collective affairs with the art of driving a ship.
The  point  is  that  there  is  not  a  single  driver  of  global  governance  but  rather  that
governance is impacted by a number of factors, including: political actors with diverse
interests and preferences (including state and non-state actors), hierarchies (e. g. national
and  local  governments  and  NGOs,  but  also  international  organisations,  transnational
corporations,  transnational  advocacy  coalitions),  market  developments  (e.  g.
3financialisation,  international  trade,  innovation),  as  well  as  networks,  including  new
advocacy and professional networks and communities of experts.
International relations studies have produced a very rich intellectual debate on
global governance since the very inception of the League of Nations. This debate has
focused on the potential and the actual advantages of international law and international
organisations, the aggregate outcomes of allegedly self-serving national foreign policies,
the  making  of  an  international  society,  and  the  management  of  the  world  economy.
Noticeably, however, the relevance of global governance and, in particular, the role of
non-state actors, are underappreciated themes in these studies (Jorgensen 2010). 
With regard to the education sector, Mundy and Murphy (2001) aptly foresaw
more than a decade ago that public debates and advocacy around education have gone
global. While these authors highlighted the new proliferation of transnational non-state
actors who were interested in education and engaged in innovative patterns of interaction,
later discussion has also started to appraise the consequences  of this social change.  So
far, international comparative research on campaigns supporting EFA throughout the
world has noted that cohesive and well-connected coalitions often manage to
influence decision-making and agenda-setting processes, while weaker coalitions are only
able to articulate a set of more or less coherent policy demands. Authors have also noticed
the  complementarity  of  the delivery  and advocacy functions  of  NGOs (Mundy  et  al.
2010; Rose 2011; Strutt and Kepe 2010). 
Some authors claim that global advocacy networks and NGOs widen the space
of  democracy  to  the  extent  that  they  are  committed  to  human  rights  (Dryzek  2010;
Tandon and Brown 2013), and particularly to the right to education (Gaventa and Mayo
2009), in a more reflexive and creative way than public organisations. However, other
experts blame these agents for lack of democratic control and for exercising subtle forms
of domination beyond the official spaces of policy engagement (Kamruzzaman 2013).
Recent studies have suggested that global civil society has a dual character that leads to
both emancipation and regulation simultaneously. This feature is particularly noticeable
in the educational terrain (Mcpherson 2015; Menashy 2016). In the present paper we try
to expand this argument by looking at a wider set of evaluation criteria (Biersteker 2015).
4Theoretical orientation
In order  to  define  global  governance,  this  article  draws on the  International  Political
Economy  tradition,  which  links  the  concerns  of  international  relations  experts  with
concepts  of  conflict,  power  and  economic  institutions.  From this  perspective,  global
governance is an interactive order that conveys authority in multiple sites.
- In global  governance  scenarios,  agents  influence  each other  mutually,  but  not
evenly since influence happens under the constraints and endowments patterned
by  social  structures.  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  any  agent  not  only
impinges on others’ strategies but is also influenced by them. Moreover, agents
use  a  set  of  economic,  political  and  ideological  technologies  to  pursue  their
interests. They are equipped with varied (sometimes uneven) sets of instruments
depending  on  their  history,  their  position  in  the  world  order,  the  resources
available to them, their traditional relations, etc. These are structural processes
insofar  as  they  have  been constructed  prior  to  the particular  interaction  under
analysis (Biersteker 2015; Kahler and Lake 2003).
- Global  governance  conveys  authority,  guidance,  and  compliance  concerning
collective activities. Some agents are more authoritative in that they can make a
difference  in  the  rules  of  the  game,  or  they  can  set  the  guidelines  of  official
policy-making (Biersteker 2015). Notably, the location of authority can shift over
time  and  may  be  the  outcome  of  transformations  within  the  nation  state,  for
instance, the reinforcement of the executive branch with regard to the legislative
chambers.
- Global  governance  takes  place  in  multiple  sites,  normally  structured  as  non-
nested, complex geographical scales by the strategies and collaborations of the
agents  included.  It  is  global,  regional,  national  and local,  and in fact  operates
through several geographical scales at the same time (Lingard and Rawolle 2011).
Agents provoke this complexity by looking for the better site(s) to launch their
5strategies. Since they can operate locally, nationally and globally simultaneously,
these scales are not nested, that is, it does not make sense to assume that the local
is subsumed under the national, and the local and the national are subsumed under
the global (Kahler and Lake 2003).
A strand of political theory has discussed the potential to democratise global governance.
In other words, some democracy theorists have availed of studies of global governance to
challenge the taken-for-granted assumption that democracy can only take place at the
national level. In their view, it is necessary to explore the potential for both local and
global democracy since there are not normative reasons to exclude these other scales of
policy-making from democratic tenets. Similarly, it is not only elected governments who
must  be  held  accountable  for  democratic  action,  but  organisations,  corporations,
networks, associations and communities operating at a supra-national scale too as far as
they have an influence in citizens’  lives.  In this  vein,  global  governance should tend
towards cosmopolitan democracy, which is defined as “an attempt to generate democratic
governance at a variety of levels, incorporating different spheres of politics” (Archibugi
and Held 2011, 441).
The CSEF can be actually seen as an attempt to promote the global governance
of education in the direction of cosmopolitan democracy. Our goal here is to convey what
can be learned in terms of the global governance of public assets such as education, and
whether the CSEF had an impact in democratising global education policy. To this end,
we  draw  on  Biesrteker's  (2015)  proposal  to  appraise  the  effects  of  the  CSEF  on
democratic  practice  of  global  governance  by  looking  at  the  following  dimensions:
inclusiveness,  representativeness,  adaptability,  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  fairness.
Each of these dimensions is defined in the relevant sections below. 
Drawing  on  this  perspective,  we  want  to  make  a  methodological  and  a
substantive point regarding the contribution of the CSEF to global governance.  As to
methodology, global governance should be analysed through the strategic interaction of
political actors. That is to say, it is necessary not only to identify who are these actors, but
also which strategies they implement, which resources (both material and cognitive) they
avail  of,  and  how  their  action  shapes  geographical  scales  and  constitutes  complex
6institutional assemblages. These outcomes are sometimes transitory, but this is not the
only pattern that can be observed empirically.  Often,  the outcome of the interplay of
actors is the shaping of institutional assemblages that entail important contradictions, but
may be stable over time. Through the CSEF, the use of international funds aiming to
strengthen civil society networks in the educational terrain has arguably created one of
these  assemblages.  In  addition,  such assemblages  normally  transform the  relationship
between institutions and territory because  political interaction takes place between actors
who operate at different geographical scales.
The Civil Society Education Fund 
The  CSEF  aims at providing support to the work of civil society education coalitions,
also known as national education coalitions (NECs), so that they can fully engage in the
promotion of EFA goals in those countries where they operate. NECs are networks of
civil society actors that articulate local NGOs, teachers unions, women’s organizations,
international NGOs, parents associations and grassroots’ organizations. According to the
CSEF project, developing an active, well-organized and well-articulated civil society –
linked  together  regionally  and  globally  –  that  advocates  the  right  to  education  and
progressive policy change is one of the best ways to ensure that all children will have
access to relevant and quality education [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the
review process]. 
In its first stage, the CSEF project operated during two years, between mid-2009
and mid-2011, and US$17.6 million was allocated to it.  The project has been funded
through the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI), currently known as the
Global Partnership for Education, and has been implemented by the Global Campaign for
Education (GCE) under the supervisory role of the World Bank. The GCE, the biggest
and most active civil society transnational network advocating EFA, was chosen for its
central role in the EFA movement and its capacity to agglutinate key civil society actors.
As [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process] explain: 
“The GCE was set up in the late 1990s, in the run up to the Dakar Conference, with
the objective of pushing for an ambitious EFA agenda. It brought together several
7International NGOs (Oxfam, Action Aid, Global March for Labour) and Education
International (the global federation of teachers unions). With the passage of time, the
GCE evolved into a multi-scalar organization by promoting and strengthening the
role of civil society advocacy coalitions operating at the national and regional level.
In the context of these coalitions, very different types of organizations work together
to put pressure on national governments, donors and international organizations to
honour financial and political agreements to deliver high quality education to all.”
At the global level, the GCE acted as the executing agency and hosted a secretariat to
have overall  oversight  of three regional  CSEFs established in  Africa,  Asia  and Latin
America.  The  regional  coalitions,  which were already members  of the GCE (African
Network Campaign for Education For All in Africa, Asia South Pacific Association for
Basic  and  Adult  Education  in  Asia  and  Latin-American  Campaign  for  the  Right  to
Education  [Campaña  Latinoamericana  por  el  Derecho  a  la  Educación]  in  Latin
America),  hosted sub-secretariats  that  were in charge of supporting NECs within this
process in different ways. Three regional  funding committees  were established in each
region,  each  one  made  up  of  credible  individuals  from  across  the  region,  to  make
decisions regarding the allocation of funds. And three  financial  management  agencies
were identified (Oxfam GB in Africa,  Education International  in Asia,  Action Aid in
Latin America) to ensure sound financial management. In the period analysed, the CSEF
supported NECs in 45 countries as a way to enable them to advocate the EFA goals more
effectively and to ensure an active role in GPE related policy processes. 
The design of the CSEF clearly separated strategic management from funding
management as a way to avoid the interference of international donors and international
NGOs in the policy-making process of the beneficiary organizations, but also as a way
for the GCE and the regional organizations to focus on their programmatic and strategic
role. At the operational level, the CSEF has been structured, on the one hand, around
objectives  and  activities  that  are  linked  to  the  GCE and  primary  processes:  namely,
educational advocacy for EFA goals and, related to it, the necessary training, research
and technical capacity building initiatives to ensure efficient educational advocacy. On
the other hand, the CSEF has followed long-term objectives of a different nature and that
are usually less visible, such as the organizational strengthening of the coalitions (through
8capacity building and other means) and the development of models for self-sustainability.
These support processes consist of financial management, human resources management,
communication,  and monitoring and evaluation levels.  Diagram 1 visually depicts  the
organization and workflow of the CSEF. 
Diagram 1 here
The national educational coalitions drew on these resources provided by the CSEF in
order to develop new instruments for advocacy, conduct research, underpin the training
of their stakeholders, increase their human resources and strengthen their profile in the
media. Although the variation between countries was noticeable, Table 1 highlights the
most common activities undertaken by the CSEF-funded NECs between 2009 and 2011.
Table 1 here
Methodology
In order to capture the intricacies of global governance, in 2012 and 2013 we collected
data through interviews and document analysis  at  the national  level  in seven national
education  coalitions  (see  Appendix  1),  and  at  the  regional  and  global  levels  (see
Appendix  2).  Basically,  the  interviews  asked  questions  about  national  politics,  the
emergence of national educational coalitions, the articulation of advocacy with research
and training, and the outcomes of this advocacy. In-depth case studies were conducted in
Bolivia,  Cambodia,  Mongolia,  Sierra Leone,  Senegal,  Mozambique and Malawi.  This
purposive  sample  included  countries  located  in  different  continents,  more  and  less
propitious political contexts, long-term and recently established NECs, varying areas of
expertise and interest and both big and small grants. Interviews in each country covered
multiple stakeholder types such as NEC members (board, secretariat), teachers’ unions
(independently of whether they are members of the coalition or not), other civil society
organizations,  national  CSEF  coordinators,  international  donors  (bilateral  and
9multilateral),  education  policy-makers  and  decision  makers,  parliamentarians,  media
representatives,  and  education  scholars.  Thus,  a  total  number  of  126  interviews
triangulated the voice of NEC members and non-members in order to depict a nuanced
picture. 
We also conducted 33 interviews with key global  and regional  actors  in  the
governance  and  management  of  the  CSEF.  Specifically,  at  the  global  level,  we
interviewed members of the GCE board, GCE secretariat, and GPE secretariat, and, at the
regional  level,  we  interviewed  representatives  of  the  CSEF  Regional  Funding
Committees, the CSEF regional secretariat and the regional finance agency. Interviews
with key global and regional players have been an important data source to evaluate the
architecture and governance of the CSEF.
Beyond interviews with key national, regional and global players, the evaluation
relied on secondary data sources (including NEC completion reports, CSEF progression
reports, a GCE survey on the CSEF, and GCE/regional organizations narrative reports).
The  document  equivalence  technique  (i.e.  comparing   the  global  discourse  with  the
national discourses in relation to the fund) was used to empirically triangulate the effects
of the CSEF at the national level. 
On  the  matter  of  outcomes,  a  final  point  on  attribution  is  necessary  before
proceeding. While we do, in some sections, discuss a range of discrete outcomes, we
understand  the  CSEF not  as  being  the  only  causal  factor  but  rather  as  being  a  key
contributor.  That is, in addition to tracing each of the supranational links portrayed in
Diagram 1, when considering effects at the national level, we analysed the data collected
in terms of how the CSEF affected NECs’ institutional  setting and how that,  in turn,
enabled certain advocacy strategies and organizational processes, which subsequently fed
into their legitimacy, involvement, and policy influence. Put differently, we  identify the
ways  that  the  CSEF—as  one  factor  among  many—contributed  to  the  strategies,
processes, achievements of NECs (Klugman 2011; Mayne 2008) using analytic tactics
such as process tracing, contribution analysis, and the most significant change approach
(White and Phillips 2012). This point on attribution is important because the CSEF was
introduced  into  a  complex  assemblage  where  multiple  processes  and  pressures
overlapped and impinged on one another.
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Findings
Table 2 summarises the main findings of the evaluation of CSEF 2009-2011 with regard
to Biersteker's (2015) criteria.  This section draws on the evidence collected by [name
deleted  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  review  process]  in  order  to  evaluate  the
achievements and shortcomings of the CSEF in these terms. 
Table 2 here
An  inclusive  system  of  governance  should  engage  all  the  affected  populations.  The
system would be also representative if these populations were able to express themselves
on an official basis (Biersteker 2015). In general, the CSEF was quite inclusive, although
its representativeness was somehow problematic. 
On the one hand, the official strategy openly aimed at engaging all the NECs. A
diverse array of political actors was involved in the coalitions. Since all of them could
tailor their strategies to the challenges, contexts, and needs they faced, the CSEF clearly
allowed national actors to make their own decisions with regard to advocacy, research,
and training, thus underpinning their own capacity.
“We valued that  what   [NECs]  wanted to  do was also in  line  with regional  and
national  campaigns....  I  wouldn’t  say  that  coalitions  were  pushed into  doing that
[budget tracking], we’d presented them a menu of things where we describe how, you
know, if what you’re doing is fitting, it does fit in this international campaign, that’s
great and then these or those are available too, like for example Global Action Week
things, or One Goal Campaign... some coalitions took them up with energy and others
did not, ahh, but they were not penalised in any way or pressured...”(Interview with a
member of the CSEF-Asia) 
In general, national coalitions were able to adapt the general strategy to their own terms.
Thus,  in  Senegal  the  NEC decided  to  stand  for  the  rights  of  the  poorest  and  most
marginalised population. In Cambodia, the coalition aimed at strengthening its members’
advocacy capacity and ability to facilitate community engagement in quality education in
selected provinces, in addition to compiling a community engagement pilot manual and
encouraging replication by education NGOs and other interested parties. In Mongolia, the
11
priority was widening the circle of official consultation of educational policy-making [a
reference has been deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]
On the other hand, these NECs did not have a say in all the areas of activity.
Specifically, the CSEF provided support to global communication initiatives launched by
the GCE which laid completely out of the reach of national coalitions. In fact,  the Global
Action  Week – a  campaign that  invites  all  NECs to  organise  street  and/or  advocacy
actions for education in the same week of the year – and the One Goal Campaign – which
took advantage of the World Cup in South Africa as a way to advocate for the importance
of education through soccer celebrities – were only designed and controlled by a small
group of senior officers. 
The implementation of the CSEF also posited time constraints  to the funded
coalitions. Most interviewees reported on the difficulties to harmonise the everyday work
of  national  coalitions  and the  official  reporting  deadlines.  An important  delay  in  the
starting date of the fund of eighteen months (related to the difficulties of negotiating the
terms of references) and a final pressure to report by the end of 2011 really became a
burden for  many national  coalitions,  who felt  they  were  under  excessive  pressure  to
deliver  and  the  surveillance  of  an  external  authority.  Such  difficulties  have  been
acknowledged by the executing agency at the global level (GCE), both in interviews and
officials reports:
“During  the  first  semester  of  the  project  (September-December  2009)  major
challenges  were  experienced  due  to  the  delayed  release  of  funds.  The  delay  in
disbursement  led  to  a  delay  in  implementation  by  up  to  5  months.  Project
implementation in most  countries did not  start  until  December 2009.  The shorter
duration of only 9 months for the project in year 1 caused a backlog in activities,
clogging the implementation schedule” (GCE, 2010)
“Now on the CSEF Bridging Fund there is only a one year proposal that at max,
needs  to  be  executed  by  March  2013,  but  there  are  countries  that  still  have  not
received any money (…) It is not fair that NECs had to face the consequences of
problems with financial absorption, especially in Year 2, when already fixed contracts
for HR were leaving the NECs in a difficult situation” (Interview with a member of
the GCE/CSEF Global Secretariat)
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In  the  context  of  global  governance,  effectiveness  focuses  on  whether  a  governance
arrangement is able to provide public goods that are not delivered at the domestic level,
either  by local  institutions  or other  international  organizations  (Biersteker  2015).  The
point  is  that  Table  1  clearly  indicates  that  most  NECs managed to  use  the  funds  to
undertake  the  activities  they  were  expected  to.  However,  it  is  remarkable  that  their
research capacity was quite disparate, since some NECs went further than other ones. 
Notably,  the CSEF has clearly had a visible impact  in reinforcing the visibility
and the recognition of the NECs.  Many governments, audiences and international
organisations have  actually recognised the NECs in a number of countries  as  key
educational  stakeholders,  to the extent that coalitions  sit on many governmental
committees, and are included in various consultation and decision-making platforms
of governmental actors and donors.
Table 3 shows that NECs were invited to a variety of official meetings. Most
of them were fully recognised as partners in the national commissions dealing with
EFA in each country (A). A similar number of NECs took part in the development,
endorsement, appraisal and monitoring of the Education Sector  Plan (B). Little
variation is visible regarding the number of NECs active in annual joint sector
reviews (C) and having full access to education sector plans and sector policy
documentation (D), while only two coalitions had only partial access (E).
Table 3 here
The ‘net’ effect  in terms of prestige and recognition has to be considered against the
different  political  contexts  in  which  NECs  develop  their  work.  In  countries  like
Cambodia  or  Senegal,  where  CSOs were traditionally  seen by the government  as  an
obstacle for policy making, the increase in political  recognition in such bodies as the
Education  Sector  Working  Group  meant  a  significant  impact  achievement  for  civil
society and the CSEF in particular. 
Adaptability lies in the capacity of global governance schemes to accommodate
change (Biersteker 2015). Certainly, the evaluation of a short period does not ground a
sound conclusion in this regard, but a few pieces of evidence sketch the potential of the
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CSEF  to  respond  to  some  emerging  challenges.  In  fact,  the  work  chart  depicted  in
Diagram 1 maps out a complex balance between two logics of social action. On the one
hand, teacher unions and multi-stakeholders' coalitions focusing on EFA were gathered
so as to put pressure on policy-makers. On the other hand, the regional and the financial
agencies were established in order to carry out an official project defining clear lines of
command  and mechanisms for  accountability.  As  illustrated  by  the  quote  below,  the
coexistence  of  these  two  logics  of  action  led  to  an  uneasy  transformation  of  the
relationship between the regional coalitions and the NECs – and in fact some NECs start
regarding regional coalitions as donors to whom they were accountable: 
“One thing is to have a network where members generally contribute to the network
by,  for  instance,  paying  membership  fees,  because  the  coalition  members  are
collectively committed to this collective political project, beyond the interests of their
particular coalition… This is a social movement or network logic, versus the donor
logic, where coalitions receive funds from the network (…) The relationship gets
reversed,  there  begins  to  be a tension that  undermines  the  political  alliances  that
should be there...” (Interview with a member of the GCE Board)
In the evaluation research, some voices expressed concern with the repercussion of this
complex architecture for social movements, and vindicated the transformation of the fund
into an open learning platform. Clearly, this was not the official position. Besides the
aforementioned  constraint  for  accountability,  it  is  plausible  to  interpret  that  the  very
possibility to express this tension, captured by the quote below, opens some room for the
CSEF to accommodate change. 
“We would like to stay on campaign, and advocacy for all and so on and so on. Not to
become  something  receiving  money,  distributing  money  (...)”  (Interview  with  a
member of the GCE Board)
Efficiency is the capacity of a governance scheme to provide these public goods at the
lowest possible cost (Biersteker 2015). In this vein, and despite it is hard to assess to what
extent the CSEF was efficient in quantitative terms, most NEC reports mentioned some
indirect evidence of an economic use of resources, not only because the very institutional
capacity of the NECs depended on the staff they could hire with CSEF funds, but also
because many of these NECs also reported an increasing capacity to attract volunteers.
In addition, many NECs were able to to attract significant additional funding. In
the  period  analysed,  the total amount generated by all the coalitions amounted  to
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almost ten million USD. Table 4 presents the evolution of the funding generated by the
coalitions outside the CSEF, on a yearly basis. We distinguish, on the one hand, between
externally  generated funding received from the government,  private  organizations and
other  aid  agencies  and,  on the  other  hand,  internally  generated  funds in  the  form of
member  fees,  fund-raising activities,  etc.  Not  all  the coalitions  could attract  funding,
whether internal or external, at the same level, since in the analysed period half of the
NECs received external funding, and less than half of them generated part of their funds
internally. 
Table 4 here
In general terms, the evidence presented so far shows that the CSEF has contributed to
building stronger and more credible advocacy coalitions. Nonetheless, the potential for
the NECs to maintain their  activity ultimately depends on their capacity to  enact  a
virtuous  cycle  between their primary processes  (i.e.  capacity building, advocacy,
research and training),  support processes (i.e.,  human resources management,  internal
communication, monitoring and evaluation, etc.), and concrete policy outcomes. In some
cases, training and capacity building have proved to be the missing link in this cycle.
However, where the NECs have faced more recurrent problems is in terms of support
processes. We reflect below on how a mismatch between primary and support processes
has impeded the CSEF to achieve its full potential. 
To start with, the GCE did not have the appropriate human resources in place
when the CSEF project started. The tensions between the World Bank and the GCE
l e d  t o  i rregular and late funding disbursements,  which created cash flow problems
and put pressure on project execution and final spending.
Nevertheless, the main challenge the CSEF faced during the project cycle was
the high turnover of managerial positions at all levels and at key points in the project
cycle, in addition to a lack of leadership and coordination capacity from the CSEF
global secretariat.
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Various reasons for this turnover  were  identified in the interviews: (1)
insecurity because of unclear sustainability of the programme, (2) disparities and
delays in salary payments and, (3) workload and external pressure. High turnover
also affected organisational memory and the impact of learning, skill-sharing, and
staff training.
The overarching monitoring and evaluation for the whole of the CSEF- funded
processes was also agreed  upon too  late,  once the project had already  started. The
framework  covered  a  broad  range  of  items  and allowed for the collection and
publication of important data related to project implementation. However, the
framework was also very complex and time-consuming, and the lack of central guidance
contributed to the fact that not all members followed the framework with the same level
of consistency. Subsequently,  changing the requirements around  monitoring  and
evaluation procedures led to confusion and to additional  workload among the CSEF
staff.  Lastly,  several  interviewees complained of problems with the information
technology system, and their difficulty communicating up-to-date information to all
members, information which was relevant for monitoring and evaluation.
The CSEF poses important questions regarding to whom the national coalitions
and the regional committees were eventually accountable. In fact, the whole institutional
design included two conflicting logics of political  action.  Interestingly,  whilst  official
programmes  respond  to  explicit  projects  which  are  allegedly  supported  by  public
resources  according  to  some  specific  conditions,  civil  society  normally  launches
collective action to pursue some very meaningful but not always precise goals on the
grounds of the present capabilities of unions, non-profit organisations and community
movements. Integrating these two sets of expectations is neither automatic nor easy. 
According to the organisational chart of the CSEF, national coalitions had to
report to regional committees who also had to report to the incumbent financial agency
either in Africa, Asia or Latin America. This procedure became quite confusing for most
stakeholders insofar as some representatives sat on both the boards of national coalitions
and the regional committees. In addition, the regional committees played a contradictory
set of roles, because they had to provide support to the national coalitions at the same
time  as  they  observed  whether  the  activities  of  these  coalitions  were  appropriate.
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Although the issue did not become a conflict of interest, it was a real problem when many
interviewees attempted to figure out how the whole organisation worked [name deleted to
maintain the integrity of the review process]. 
In fact, since the World Bank did not adopt a proactive role, the GPE secretariat
eventually became a de facto supervising entity. As a consequence, interviewees reported
that the GPE  ultimately failed to support some important activities related to the CSEF.
“There was no enabling engagement from the Bank or even from the FTI to ensure
that what the CSEF wanted to accomplish was supported by them in their processes. I
think there was a huge sort of gap between the stated aims of this project and its
ownership by the partnership that approved this project. The bank is a partner, the
FTI’s secretariat, it supports the partnership, the other donors are partners, and yet
none of them own this agenda enough (...) And I think that really stems from this
model of the Bank, ‘Here is the money, we deliver it, then you report back, and as
long as there is no corruption, you know, our reputational risk is reduced, and we are
not worried’.” (Interview with a member of the GCE)
In addition, the time and effort required by the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
prevented  regional  bodies  to  focus  on  political  and  strategic  action,  such  as  the
organization of advocacy campaigns and research at a regional level: 
“If you ask me, I think it went a little over board, you know, these are the tensions,
because in some ways I think a balance needs to be struck between how much energy
sapped out the coalitions, to deal with, attending to financial and administrative nitty-
gritty...  versus the energy that  goes into the substantive part  of  the  work...  It’s  a
constant tension, there’s a constant tension in that.” (Interview with a member of the
CSEF -Asia)
In this vein, decentralisation became a further challenge to map out a clear picture of the
whole system. In coherence with the organisation of the GCE, each world region decided
on  its  own  system  to  monitor  and  evaluate  the  activities  sponsored  by  the  CSEF.
Therefore,  since  it  was  extremely  difficult  to  identify  a  common  approach  to
accountability  in the three world regions,  it  was not possible  to conclude that  all  the
coalitions had been responding to the same accountability requirements [name deleted to
maintain the integrity of the review process].
Fairness consists of equal treatment  in the  distribution of resources as well as
equal recognition of the voice of participants. As to resources, since the CSEF responded
to the proposals of the individual NECs that participated voluntarily in the CSEF, fairness
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was not at all an issue. However, some coalitions asked for specific resources to foster
coordination with local communities.  Others openly complained for the quality of the
feedback that the regional bodies provided to them. Apparently, their vision of a two-way
dialogue did not easily fit within the on-going activity of the CSEF, as illustrated by the
following quotes:  
“I realise that our current main shortcoming has to do with evaluation and monitoring. In
our view, a coalition which aims at being really national should be much more present on
the ground. It means that the organisation has means of transport to get to places like
Tambacounda, Kédougou or Ziguinchor, where people live. The organisation has to meet
and help the local activists on a regular basis,  because they often lack the necessary
expertise. Definitely, the CSEF should cater to this need. ” (Interview with a member of
the NEC-Senegal, authors’ translation)
“[The regional  body]  should have a section on monitoring and evaluation ...  of  the
projects (…) They don’t have – the evaluation is external, like somebody coming from
the outside, but they don’t have internal evaluation, even that when you come here and
you put  your  report,  (somebody  reads  it,  but  there  is  no  one  for  whom it  is  their
organizational responsibility to read and act on the content of the report. There needs to
be a position and process.) Like we have a research unit and an advocacy unit, I think
they should have a M&E unit” (Interview with a member of the NEC-Cambodia)
Discussion and concluding remarks
Global governance takes place in an interactive order that conveys authority and other
political  resources  in  complex  geographical  settings  featured  by  several  geographical
scales  (or  non-nested  spatial  hierarchies  of  sites).  Although  political  theory  cannot
establish  a  general  principle  of  global  democracy,  the  democratic  component  of  the
observed modes of governance can be partially appraised in accordance to some widely
accepted  criteria,  including  inclusiveness,  effectiveness,  accountability  and  fairness,
among other criteria  (Biersteker  2015).  These criteria  suggest how to assess both the
intended and the emergent effects that interactive orders bring about. In the end, while the
CSEF clearly represents a step forward for efforts at creating cosmopolitan democracy
(Archibugi and Held 2001, 441), a number of lessons and challenges to be addressed in
future similar initiatives can be elaborated.
The main takeaway of the evaluation of the CSEF for the 2009-2011 period is that
a virtuous combination of international recognition plus improved capacity, research, and
advocacy, enabled NECs, first, to be recognized by governments, second, to gain access
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to  key  spaces  of  agenda-setting  and  decision-making,  and  third,  to  contextualise  the
global  EFA  goals  in  meaningful  terms  for  national  political  actors.  Crucial  to  this
cumulative circle is the energizing effect of advocacy underpinned by research..  National
coalitions  launched  more  effective  strategies  when  they  became  capable  to  find
significant  evidence  of  a  number  of  issues  (e.g.  actual  compliance  with  the  official
educational  budget,  attention  to  discriminated  groups  such  as  girls  or  minorities,
observation of teachers’ labour conditions). The deployment of communication strategies
also contributed  to  these effects  in most  countries.  Additionally,  the NECs that  were
supported by the fund managed to multiply their human resources via volunteer work and
their financial resources by becoming more appealing to national donors.
Once NECs are recognised,  their proposals can  be  more  easily  taken  into
account within education policy processes, or  enter the political agenda and become
possible assets for candidates in elections and in  campaigns launched by diverse
social movements. However, it must be kept in mind that formal presence in  policy
spaces  does not guarantee significant participation and influence, though greater levels
of  visibility  and recognition  are  a  necessary  condition  for  achieving  higher  levels  of
impact. Recognition can also have a positive effect on medium-term sustainability since
it raises their credibility and makes donors more willing to fund their activities. Once a
new actor is fully accepted, the actor’s influence is likely to be durable and to increase
because it can entrench itself in the structure of political interplay over time.
However,  one  question  remains:  have  these  advocacy  activities  accelerated
progress toward educational goals? On the one hand, we cannot claim causality insofar as
other indirect factors may have played a role, particularly if their intervention is difficult
to observe. On the other hand, Table 1 shows that many coalitions put pressure on policy-
makers and legislators. In addition, in fifteen countries the CSEF supported coalitions and
the  education  budget  increased  substantially.  Thus,  we can  consider  that  at  least  this
support contributed to that progress.. 
This study has also evidenced a number of challenges and considerations that
must be taken into account in the future to improve global governance arrangements like
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the  CSEF,  which  work  across  multiple  scales  and  depend  on  the  coordination  and
collaboration of multiple actors. These include: 
- The need to define and to disseminate the overarching monitoring and evaluation
framework ahead of  time,  to  inform those  who will  be  evaluated  in  a  timely
fashion,  and so that  program implementers  can appropriately  respond to those
frameworks before it is time to be evaluated. At the same time, it is important to
balance the design and application of the monitoring and evaluation framework
with the need of national coalitions to design strategies that respond to their local
contexts. 
- Prevent  discrepancies  between the funding and implementing  agencies  (in this
case,  the World Bank and the GCE), since these conflicts  can have important
consequences for the availability and timing of funds for national actors.
- Improving functionality  requires  clarifying  lines  of  accountability  and perhaps
separating  the  roles  of  support  and  evaluation/monitoring,  in  order  to  avoid
dysfunctional  relationships  between  national  actors  and,  for  example,  their
counterparts in regional or international entities. 
- At  the  design  stage,  it  will  be  important  to  think  about  how to  enhance  the
representativeness of national coalitions/actors, so that they are not only included
in global governance processes, but they can contribute to shape these processes
from the beginning. Relatedly, it will be essential to include protocols in global
governance  designs  that  allow  the  stakeholders  to  challenge  the  fairness  of
resource  allocation  and  the  processes  on  which  the  global  governance
arrangement depends.
- Programme sustainability and continuity will be essential for many reasons, one
of which is to reduce turnover in key staff positions.
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- In  terms  of  communication,  improvements  can  be  made  when  it  comes  to
instituting systems and processes for sharing information,  successes, strategies,
etc. across countries and regions. 
Ultimately,  we need  to  learn  from the  analysed  initiative  because  global  governance
arrangements  are still  evolving and because these arrangements can have real impact.
Moreover, such arrangements will be extremely necessary if the world is to have any
chance  of  meeting  the  new  international  development  agenda,  as  embodied  in  the
Sustainable Development Goals. As emphasized by this paper, in moving towards these
and other goals through global governance arrangements, it is not only the outcomes that




Archer, D. 2010. “The Evolution of NGO –Government Relations in Education: 
ActionAid 1972– 2009.” Development in Practice 20 (4–5): 611–18.
Archibugi, D., and D. Held. 2011. “Cosmopolitan Democracy: Paths and Agents.” Ethics
and International Affairs 25 (4): 433–61.
Biersteker, Th. 2015. “Global Governance.” In On Governance: National and 
International Dimensions of Measuring Governance Effectiveness, edited by 
Robert I. Rotberg. Waterloo (CA): Center for International Governance 
Innovation.
Dryzek, J. 2012. “Global Civil Society: The Progress of Post-Westphalian Politics.” 
Annual Review of Political Science 15: 101–19.
Gaventa, J., and M. Mayo. 2009. Spanning Citizenship Spaces Through Transnational 
Coalitions: The Case of the Global Campaign for Education. IDS Working Paper 
327. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
Global Campaign for Education (GCE). 2010. CSEF Capacity Support Plan. 
Jonhannesburg: Global Campaign for Education.
21
Jorgensen, K. E. 2010. International Relations Theory. A New Introduction. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Kahler, M., and D.A. Lake. 2003. Governance in a Global Economy. Political Authority 
in Transition. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Kamruzzaman, P. 2013. “Civil Society or ‘Comprador Class’, Participation or 
Parroting?” Progress in Development Studies 13 (1): 31–49.
Klugman, B. 2011. “Effective Social Justice Advocacy: A Theory-of-Change Framework
for Assessing Progress”. Repoductive Health Matters 19 (38): 146–62.
Lingard, B., and S. Rawolle. 2011. “New Scalar Politics: Implications for Education 
Policy.” Comparative Education 47 (4): 489–502.
Macpherson, I. 2016. “An Analysis of Power in Transnational Advocacy Networks in 
Education.” In The Handbook of Global Education Policy, edited by K. Mundy, 
A. Green, B. Lingard, and A. Verger. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Mayne, J. 2008. Contribution Analysis: An Approach to Exploring Cause and Effect. 
ILAC Brief 16. Rome: ILAC/CGIAR.
Menashy, F. 2016. “Understanding the Roles of Non-State Actors in Global Governance: 
Evidence from the Global Partnership for Education.” Journal of Education 
Policy 31 (1): 98–118.
Mundy, K., M. Haggerty, M. Sivasubramaniam, S. Cherry, and S. Maclure. 2010. “Civil 
Society, Basic Education, and Sector-Wide Aid: Insights from Sub-Saharan 
Africa.” Development in Practice 20 (4–5): 484–97.
Mundy, K., and L. Murphy. 2001. “Transnational Advocacy, Global Civil Society? 
Emerging Evidence from the Field of Education.” Comparative Education 
Review 45 (1): 85–126.
Rose, P. 2011. “Strategies for Engagement: Government and National Non-Government 
Education Providers in South Asia.” Public Administration and Development 31 
(4): 294–305.
Strutt, C., and Th. Kepe. 2010. “Implementing Education for All–Whose Agenda, Whose
Change? The Case Study of the Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition.” 
International Journal of Educational Development 30 (4): 369–376.
Tandon, R., and D. Brown. 2013. “Civil Societies at Crossroads: Eruptions, Initiatives, 
and Evolution in Citizen Activism.” Development in Practice 23 (5–6): 601–8.
White, H., and D. Phillips. 2012. Addressing Attribution of Cause and Effect in Small N 
Impact Evaluations: Towards an Integrated Framework. 3IE Working Paper 15. 
New Delhi: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation.




Activities undertaken by the CSEF- funded NECs (2009-2011)
Advocacy Most NECs engaged in lobbying activities such as meeting policy-makers (in ministries of 
education and finance as well as parliaments), convening roundtables, making petitions (by 
issuing memoranda, sending public letters to authorities and delivering research reports to 
parliaments), putting pressure on budget decision-makers and contributing to legislative work 
(29 coalitions reported contributing to legislative changes such as promoting new education laws
and launching new policies)
Research NECs produced 161 studies on many topics, e.g. budget tracking (32), prevailing education laws 
and systems (10), EFA reviews (9), non-sexist education and discrimination against women (8), 
teachers' training, social esteem and quality (6), fund-raising for advocacy (6), adult and youth 
literacy and continuing education (8), school fees (3) and other ones.
Training Training initiatives focused on advocacy, lobbying and communication strategies (25 NECs); 
education budgeting and funding (18 NECs), networking, partnership building, resource 
mobilization (9 NECs), national education policies, the right to education, intercultural dialogue, 
decolonisation, non-formal education, extracurricular education, rural education, inclusive 
education and community participation in education. Member organizations, non-member union 
representatives, local government representatives, school boards and councils, teachers, 
journalists and members of parliament benefited from these initiatives. 
Human resources The staff of the 7 case studies increased from 121 to 195 between 2009 and 2011
Communication In their final reports 39 NECs mentioned their participation in mass media in order to raise 
public awareness of the importance of education. Mostly, they participated in radio and 
television debates, announcements, interviews, round tables, talk-shows and news. Some of them
managed to get the support of celebrities. 21 NECs reported to have launched a website. 16 
NECs produced a regular newsletter. All of them used at least one of the following instruments 
of public communication:  producing their own posters, flyers, brochures, booklets on good 
practices in education, policy briefs and digests; disseminating copies of education acts; issuing 
user-friendly Education Watch reports; and circulating grass-roots stories. 32 NECs joined the 
GCE Global Action Week, 12 World Teachers’ Day, and the International Literacy Day. The 
CSEF also sponsored the One Goal for Africa campaign during the 2010 World Football Cup.
Source: [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]
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Table 2








* The available evidence on these criteria is substantial, while references to adaptability and 
fairness are grounded on weaker and indirect data.  Source: [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the
review process]
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Table 3. Engagement of NECs in official meetings
Type of Meeting and Engagement Number of CSEF-
funded NECs 
A. Involved in Local Educational Group/ Education Sector Working Group 35
B. Involved in the design and follow-up of the national Education Sector Plan 33
C. Involved in Annual Joint Reviews 35
D. Guaranteed full access to education sector documentation 34
E. Guaranteed only partial access to education sector documentation 2
Source: [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]
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Table 4. Source of funding of CSEF supported coalitions, 2009-2011 (US$)
2009 2010 2011 Total
Externally generated 2,825,075.08 3,656,635.53 2,570,989.76 9,052,700.37
Internally generated 104,610.48 96,609.74 196,009.45 397,229.68
Total 2,929,685.56 3,753,245.27 2,766,999.21 9,449,930.05
Source: [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]
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Appendix 1







Areas of interest Size of 
the grant
Bolivia (LAC) Conducive 2009 Inclusion, indigenous groups, 
RTE, gender 
Large 
Cambodia (Asia) Intermediate 2001 School fees, volunteer fees, 
Budget Training 
Medium 
Mongolia (Asia) Intermediate 2010 Discrimination in a general 
sense, campaign against law 
imposing school fees 
Medium 





Conducive 1999 Budget tracking, girls’ 
education, anti-corruption, GPE 
application processes, school 





Intermediate 2000 Budget tracking, education 
financing, girls’ education, anti-
corruption 
Large 
Malawi (Africa) Difficult 2000 Budget tracking, advocacy for 






Scale Number of interviews 
Global 
GCE/CSEF global secretariat 5 
GCE board 5 















 Similar funds in the 2000-2015 period were the Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF), funded
by the British government, or the Real World Strategies, funded by the Dutch government.
